Use case · Tor

Tor hosting. Exits allowed, in writing.

Most hosts stay silent about Tor until the first abuse ticket, then discover an unwritten policy. VPSRento's AUP says the opposite out loud: relays and bridges in all fifteen locations, exit relays in Iceland and Switzerland, conditions in plain English before you pay.

  • Relays & bridges: all 15 locations
  • Exits: Iceland + Switzerland
  • 1 Tbps+ DDoS protection
  • No KYC · crypto-only
deploy — tor exit, reykjavik
Why this use case

A Tor policy that was written before you asked

Running a relay is technically trivial; keeping it online is the hard part. Exit IPs attract complaints by design, and most providers treat the first one as grounds to suspend first and ask questions never — an unwritten policy is just a policy that hasn't been used against you yet.

Ours is written down. The acceptable use policy allows middle relays, guard relays and bridges in all fifteen locations with no conditions beyond the policy itself, and exit relays in Iceland and Switzerland under three plain conditions: reverse DNS identifying the node as a Tor exit (tor-exit.your-domain.tld), a contact address in the relay descriptor that stays current, and abuse tickets answered within 48 hours. That clarity is why relay collectives run our premium tier without complaining.

Offshore and no-KYC are the point, not decoration: the account is a 24-character token shown once, payment is crypto-only, and a foreign civil notice carries no force in Reykjavik or Zurich. A valid local court order still wins — that is the honest limit. Everything short of it is noise our abuse desk filters.

The exit policy in three lines

  • rDNS names the exit — e.g. tor-exit.your-domain.tld.
  • Contact stays current. The address in your relay descriptor must actually reach you.
  • 48-hour response. Answer abuse tickets within two days. That is the whole deal.
  • Middle relays & bridges are welcome in all fifteen locations with no conditions at all.
  • Humans on the desk. The abuse desk is staffed by the engineers who run the network — they know a relay from a compromise.

"Two exit relays, Iceland and Switzerland. AUP explicitly allows it, abuse desk knows what Tor is. That alone is worth the premium."

TorRelayOps nonprofit relay collective
Setup pointers

From root shell to relay in one evening

The short version — a clean KVM box, a clean IP, and standard Tor Project practice.

# Debian 13 — official Tor Project repo $ apt install apt-transport-https $ echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/tor-archive-keyring.gpg] \ https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org tor-mainline main" \ | tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/tor.list $ apt update && apt install tor

Checklist

  • Set Nickname and ContactInfo in torrc — a current contact is an AUP condition, not a nicety.
  • Cap throughput to your plan. RelayBandwidthRate and AccountingMax keep a metered plan inside its transfer; exits should just run SV-Pro and stay unmetered.
  • Exits: reduced exit policy first. Set ExitRelay 1 with a conservative policy, request rDNS naming the node, then flag it.
  • Verify on relay search (Tor Metrics) once the descriptor publishes — flags like Fast and Stable follow uptime.
  • Harden the box first: the VPS hardening checklist takes twenty minutes.

What the Tor permission is not

  • Not immunity. CSAM, botnets and C2 infrastructure, network attacks, port scanning, fraud and spam stay prohibited in every location — including traffic transiting your exit.
  • Not a jurisdiction override. Content illegal where the server physically sits is enforced everywhere, Iceland and Switzerland included.
  • Not unconditional. Miss the 48-hour abuse window repeatedly and the exit permission lapses — for your node specifically.

Privacy is not lawlessness, and Tor is infrastructure — which is why we publish the permission instead of improvising it. The rules live in one page of plain English: the acceptable use policy. Two minutes, no lawyer fog.

Honest note: running an exit will get you complaints. The measure of a Tor host is not whether complaints arrive — they will — but whether the process around them is written, staffed and sane. Ours is all three.
The plan we'd pick

Metered for relays, unmetered for exits

A middle relay rarely pushes past a few hundred GB a month; an exit can do that in a day. Match the plan to the role and nothing throttles.

Relay profile Plan Bandwidth Iceland Switzerland
Middle / guard / bridgeSV-Core · 2 vCPU · 4 GB4 TB @ 1 Gbps$12.49$12.99
Exit node (default)SV-Pro · 4 vCPU · 8 GBUnmetered @ 1 Gbps$22.99$23.99
Exit family / heavy relaySV-Max · 8 vCPU · 16 GBUnmetered @ 1 Gbps$42.49$44.49

Relaying outside the exit jurisdictions? Standard-tier locations start at $5.99/mo — full specs on the Linux VPS page. Quarterly −10% · 6 months −30% · annual −50%.

FAQ

Tor hosting, answered

Yes, in Iceland and Switzerland. Exits require reverse DNS that identifies the node as a Tor exit (e.g. tor-exit.your-domain.tld), a contact address in the relay descriptor that stays current, and abuse tickets answered within 48 hours. Middle relays, guard relays and bridges are welcome in all fifteen locations with no conditions beyond the AUP itself.

The complaint reaches our abuse desk, a human forwards it to the contact in your relay descriptor, and you answer within 48 hours. We do not monitor relay traffic, we do not suspend on form letters, and the desk knows the difference between a Tor exit and a compromised host. That workflow is written into the AUP before you pay — it is not improvised per incident.

A middle or guard relay fits comfortably on SV-Nano or SV-Core within their 2-4 TB transfer. An exit pushing real traffic should run SV-Pro or above, where bandwidth is unmetered on a 1 Gbps port — $22.99/mo in Iceland, $23.99/mo in Switzerland. Relay families pooling several exits usually land on SV-Max.

Your relay, online in 55 seconds.

Pay with crypto, get root, and a provider whose Tor policy was written before you asked.